Abstract-Remote user authentication always adopts the method of password to login the server within insecure network environments. Recently, Peyravin and Jeffries proposed a practical authentication scheme based on oneway collision-resistant hash functions. However, Shim and Munilla independently showed that the scheme is vulnerable to off-line guessing attacks. In order to remove the weakness, Hölbl, Welzer and Brumenn presented an improved secure password-based protocols for remote user authentication, password change and session key establishment.
I. INTRODUCTION
The communication network will bring convenience to people. However, people always are faced with many potential security threats over insecure network, such as the communication channel could be eavesdropped, the message transmitted could be modified and impersonation attacks could be mounted.
User Authentication enables a legitimate user to login onto a remote server. The authentication method based on password is the most commonly used technique to provide the authentication between the server and the remote user over open network. The identity information of users is usually considered to be public information whereas passwords are considered to be private or secret information. In 1981, Lamport proposed a password authentication scheme [1] to provide authentication between the legal users and the remote server. Since then, many password-based remote user authentication schemes have been proposed [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . Over the public network, an authentication scheme should provide mutual authentication, which does not only make the server verify the user but also a legal user can verify identity of the remote server.
The authentication schemes based on password can be further classified into two categories: encryption-based authentication and hash-function-based authentication. Encryption-based authentication employs symmetric key cryptosystems such as DES, AES etc. or public key cryptosystems such as RSA, ElGamal, etc. [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] .
In an encryption-based authentication scheme, encryption often is employed for protecting passwords transferred over public networks. Encryption and decryption of passwords imposes additional cost overhead on the user and remote server. In encryption-based authentication schemes, the sender and receiver of the password messages know the operative encryption and decryption schemes. Thus, the main disadvantage of the encryption-based password authentication schemes is high computational cost.
In 2000, Peyravian and Zunic proposed authentication schemes [15] for remote user authentication, password change and session key establishment over insecure networks, which are not based on cryptosystems. Their schemes are based only on the one-way collision-resistant hash functions. These functions can map efficiently binary strings of arbitrary length to binary strings of some fixed length. Furthermore, it is computationally infeasible to find two distinct inputs which hash to a common value; given a specific hash value, it is computationally infeasible to find the input. Since a hash-function-based user authentication is simpler and efficient, more and more hash-function-based user authentication schemes are proposed [16] [17] [18] .
Unfortunately, Hwang and Yeh [19] pointed that Peyravian and Zunic's schemes suffer from password guessing attacks, stolen-verifier attacks and denial-ofservice attacks. Lee et al. and Yoon et al. proposed their improved versions [16, 20] to enhance security of the Peyravian-Zunic scheme, respectively. However, Ku et al. showed [21] that these schemes still suffers from the same weaknesses of Peyravian-Zunic scheme. Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (10961013).
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II. SECURITY FLAWS OF HÖLBL -WELZER-BRUMENN'S SCHEME
In this section, we briefly review Hölbl-WelzerBrumenn's scheme (hereafter we call it as HWB scheme). HWB scheme is composed of a user authentication protocol and a password change protocol. Based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement and a collision-resistant hash function, their scheme makes use of additional exclusive-or operations to withstand the man-in-themiddle attack and the off-line dictionary attack. The scheme consists of the registration, login and authentication phases. Here we introduce the notations used throughout the paper.
C, S : a client and a server, respectively. idi : user Ui's identity. pwi : user Ui's password. p : a large prime number. g : a primitive element in GF(p). H : a collision-resistant one-way hash function. idpw_digi: H(idi, pwi).
⊕: exclusive or operation.
A. Review of HWB's user authentication protocol
In HWB scheme, the user authentication protocol consists of the following six steps.
Step Step 5 Upon receiving the authentication token from S, C computes sat'=H( xy g ;idpw_dig i ; r c ; r s ) and checks its validity by verifying if the following formula holds: sat= sat'. If Server's authentication token is valid, S is authenticated.
Step 6 Both C and S may optionally establish a symmetric session key to encrypt further information exchanged in Session after the initial authentication. {Access granted (or denied)}
B Review of HWB's password change protocol
In HWB scheme, if the user wants to update its password pw to pw_new, the user and Server perform the following six steps to complete the user's password change.
Step 1 The user U i submits id i and pw i to Client C. C generates a random value r c , chooses a large prime p and a primitive element
and a random integer x < p -1. Then C computes x g (mod p) and masks it by computing m_ ; r c ; r s ) , and checks the validity of the received mac by the equation mac' = mac. If it is valid, S sends a message to C accepting the password change. Also, S replaces idpw_digi with the new password hash value idpw_dig_new i . Otherwise, it sends a message rejecting the password change. The password accept or reject message sent from S to C contains a protected response called code = H( xy g ;idpw_dig i ; flag;r c ; r s ), where flag is set to either 'accept' or 'reject'depending upon whether the password change is accepted or rejected.
C. Cryptanlysis of HWB scheme
As the authors of HWB scheme stated that PeyravianJeffries scheme is vulnerable to off-line password-guessing attack. HWB scheme employs exclusive or operations to mask x g and y g during transfer and additional checking in order to prevent man-in-middle attacks and off-line dictionary attacks. However, some security flaws still exist in HWB scheme. We will show that the user authentication protocol of HWB scheme cannot resist offline password-guessing attack and the password change protocol suffers from denial-of-service attacks.
Off-line password guessing attacks on user authentication protocol
In the password-based authentication scheme, the user can choose his password. In general, the user tends to choose easy-to-remember passwords which will potentially lead to password guessing attack. If an adversary tries to guess passwords and could verify their correctness, password-guessing attack is called successful. The adversary first intercepts some message transferred through the channel between the user and Server. Then the adversary mounts an off-line password guessing attack on the authentication scheme.
Although the authors claim that the proposed scheme is secure against password guessing attack, we demonstrate that their user authentication protocol is subject to password guessing attack.
Suppose that an adversary intercepts the transferred message between the user (the client) and the server. Then it is easily known from the authentication protocol in Section 2.1 that the adversary can obtain {id i , r c } from the communication channel during Step 1, {ch 1 It is easy to know that the equation mac' =mac holds. Thus, S believes the validity of the received mac. S will replace idpw_digi with the new password hash value idpw_dig_new i . And S sends a message to C accepting the password change.
Thus, the adversary succeeds changing the password of the user with the identity ID. Thus, while the legal user with the identity ID logins the server with the password pw i as in Section 2.1, the server will refuse the user. Because the server has stored a new password hash value idpw_dig_new i .
III. IMPROVED SCHEME
In the section, we propose an improvement on HWB scheme, which keeps merits of original scheme and can removes the security flaws described in previous section. Like HWB scheme, we still assume that Server S has stored idpw_dig i instead of the password pw i itself. The improved scheme is based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement and a collision-resistant hash function. It consists of a user authentication protocol and a password change protocol. By id S we denote the identity of Server S.
A．Improved user authentication protocol
The user U i , Client C and Server cooperately perform the following steps to finish the user authentication protocol.
Step Step 5 Upon receiving the authentication token from S, C computes sat'=H( xy g ;idpw_dig i ; r c ; r s ) and checks its validity by verifying if the following formula holds : sat= sat'. If Server's authentication token is valid, S is authenticated.
Step 6 Both C and S may optionally establish a symmetric session key to encrypt further information exchanged in the session after the initial authentication. {Access granted (or denied)}.
B. Improved password change protocol
In HWB scheme, if the user wants to update its password pw to pw_new, the user and Server can perform the following six steps to complete the user password change.
Step 1 The user U i submits id i and pw i to Client C. C generates a random value r c , chooses a large prime p and a primitive element Step 3 Upon receiving the message from S, C first uses id i , pw i to computes The new password change protocol can be depicted as follows. In this section, we analyze the security of the improved scheme. Firstly, the improved scheme provides the following properties.
Mutual authentication: The improved user authentication protocol and password change protocol both provide mutual authentication. The mutual authentication between the user and the server is achieved applying a challenge response protocol. In essence, the hash value idpw_dig i is the proof of the mutual authentication which can make the user and the server authenticate each other. Likewise, the server would verify the identity of the user ( the client) by checking : received H( s r )=? generated H(r s ). If only the client knows the hash value idpw_dig i , the client could obtain the right random value r s using the session value ch 1 . In addition, the message mac = H( xy g ;idpw_dig_new i ; r c ; r s ;idpw_dig i ;id S ) also contains the identity id S of the server.
Forward security: The proposed scheme inherits the forward security of HWB scheme. The forward security means that even if the shared session key is disclosed, it will not lead to the compromise of any earlier session key. Since the random values x and y used in the derivation of Next, we will show that the improved scheme can resist against some possible attacks.
Man-in-the-middle attacks: In the authentication protocol, when Similarly, an adversary cannot impersonate the remote server because he does not know idpw_dig i . Therefore, it is impossible to perform the impersonate attacks on our scheme.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown that H o & & bel-WelzerBrumenn's authentication protocol is vulnerable to password guessing attack and their password change protocol suffers from Denial-of-Service attack. We propose an improved authentication scheme based on hash function and Diffie-Hellman key agreement to eliminate the security flaws. We introduce the time stamp to keep the session fresh. The user's random challenge value is protected by hash function. The improved scheme provides mutual authentication and forward security. Moreover, the proposed scheme holds higher security strength. The analysis show that the improved scheme can resist man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, password guessing attacks, outsider attacks, denial-ofService attacks and impersonation attacks. Since the improved version uses hash operations and only three exponential operations, so it has also high efficiency.
